What are the financial returns to agriculture from a common property resource?  A case study of Irish commonage by Buckley, Cathal et al.
This article is provided by the author(s) and Teagasc T-Stór in accordance
with publisher policies.
Please cite the published version.
The correct citation is available in the T-Stór record for this article.
This item is made available to you under the Creative Commons Attribution-
Non commercial-No Derivatives 3.0 License.
NOTICE: This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for
publication in Journal of Farm Management. Changes resulting from the
publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural
formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this
document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted
for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of
Farm Management, 2008, 13(5), 1-15, which may be accessed online at
www.ingentaconnect.com.
2What are the financial returns to agriculture from a common property resource? A
case study of Irish commonage.1
Cathal Buckley*
Rural Economy Research Centre, Teagasc, Athenry, Co. Galway.
and
Department of Economics, National University of Ireland, Galway
Tel: +353(0) 91 845293, Fax: +353(0) 91 845296, email: cathal.buckley@teagasc.ie
Tom M van Rensburg
Department of Economics, National University of Ireland, Galway.
Tel: +353(0) 91 493858, Fax: +353 (0) 91 524130, email: thomas.vanrensburg@nuigalway.ie
Stephen Hynes
Rural Economy Research Centre, Teagasc, Athenry, Co. Galway.
Tel: +353(0) 91 845269, Fax: +353(0) 91 845296, email: stephen.hynes@teagasc.ie
*Corresponding author.
1 This paper was written as part of a Rural Stimulus funded project, financed by The
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
3Abstract
Commonage in the Republic of Ireland has traditionally been used for
agricultural activity, mainly livestock grazing. In recent times due to its
prevailing common property characteristics and upland landscape, this resource
is increasingly attracting the interest of recreational enthusiasts. However, the
potential opportunity costs associated with recreation – namely the commercial
value of sheep and cattle grazing on commonage remains to be investigated. This
paper aims to fill this gap in the literature by analysing the agricultural returns
from livestock rearing enterprises on commonage land for a sample of farmers in
the west of Ireland. Results indicate that stocking rates are three times higher on
privately owned land compared to shared commonage. Over 80 per cent of the
farms in the sample had a gross margin under €20,000. In total, 96 per cent of
gross margin was found to be attributable to Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
payments; with area based payments twice as important as direct livestock
subsidies.
Keywords: Commonage, common property, returns to agriculture, recreation.
41. Introduction
There has been little, if any, research to-date exploring the agricultural returns to
commonage land even though it accounts for approximately 8 per cent of total
land area in the Republic of Ireland (Bleasdale, 2006) and involves 8.5 per cent
of all farms (Central Statistics Office, 2000). Results from the Teagasc2 National
Farm Survey3 (NFS) indicate that returns to livestock farming are heavily
dependant on CAP payments, particularly in marginal areas (Connolly et al.,
2004). If these payments were removed then livestock rearing activity in
commonage areas may be uneconomic for the majority of farms.
Commonage refers to land on which two or more farmers have grazing rights
(Lafferty et al., 1999). Under common law in the Republic of Ireland, land held
in commonage is seen as a tenancy in common. Each tenant holds an undivided
share in the property and has a distinct and separate interest in the property. The
ownership is divided into notional shares, rather like shares in a company.
Commonage is not physically divided so no one person owns any particular part
of the property. In a sense it is communally owned and operated and third parties
must treat the co-owners as a single unit for transactions in respect of the land
(Pearce and Mee, 2000).
This paper has four aims; firstly to explore the importance and commercial
values associated with traditional agricultural use of commonage, secondly to
2 Teagasc – the Agriculture and Food Development Authority – is a national semi state body
providing integrated research, advisory and training services to the agriculture and food industry
and rural communities.
3 National Farm Survey (NFS) is collected as part of the Farm Accountancy Data Network of the
European Union (FADN).
5evaluate the importance of CAP related payments to profitability of livestock
grazing enterprises on commonage, thirdly to compare returns to commonage
with that from privately owned land and fourthly to highlight policy concerns
associated with the resource. This study is based on a sample of 278 commonage
farmers in the west of Ireland. The remainder of the paper is organised as
follows: firstly some context and background information is provided on
commonage. Following this the policies that govern the use of farm commonage
in the Republic of Ireland are reviewed. Next a description of the research
methods is provided. Then, the empirical strategy used to examine returns to
commonage is presented and results are discussed. Finally, some discussion and
concluding remarks are offered.
2. Background
A considerable international literature (Bromley, 1992; Ostrom, 1990, 2000;
Stevenson, 1991) exists on the use of common property resources. Yet research
to-date in Ireland on this topic has been limited. Access to commonage grazing
is technically restricted to shareholders. Although shareholders have distinct
undivided shares they cannot exclude other co-shareholders, so shareholders can
rival each other for the grazing resource. Commonage in the Republic of Ireland
is characterised by the distinct lack of shareholder organisation and no
widespread local rules exist for managing the resource. In many instances, due
to the un-segregated nature of commonage it is not possible to exclude non-
shareholders. Hence, individual decisions to control stock numbers do not give a
farmer exclusive rights over the benefits of his/her actions and consequently
6many commonages suffer from overgrazing (Bleasdale 1995; Bleasdale and
Sheehy-Skeffington 1995, Emerson and Gillmor 1999).
Commonage in the Republic of Ireland is a remnant of a system of communal
tenure which is thought to have originated under the Brehon laws but which
became known during the early 19th century as the Rundale system (Andrews
1987; Kelly 1997). Under the Rundale system land around the houses was used
primarily for growing crops while the common higher ground (or outfield) was
used for livestock grazing (O'Loughlin, 1987; Whelan, 1997). Commonage
grazing rights prevailed mostly on upland tracts of land as this was considered
agriculturally uneconomic and unproductive and therefore unsuitable for division
during land reforms (Inter-departmental Committee on Land Structure Reform,
1978; O'Loughlin, 1987).
According to Bleasdale (2006) the total commonage area in the Republic of
Ireland stands at 441,125 hectares. The Census of Agriculture in 2000 indicated
that there were 11,837 farms (8 per cent nationally) using commonage for
agricultural activity (Central Statistics Office, 2000). The majority of
commonage (approximately 80% plus) is mountain or hill commonage and is
traditionally associated with extensive livestock grazing.
The majority of the commonage resource in the Republic of Ireland is
concentrated along the western seaboard. In total, 4 western counties Mayo,
Galway, Donegal and Kerry account for over 70 per cent of the commonage in
the Republic of Ireland (Bleasdale, 2006). An assessment of the importance of
7commonage across the Republic of Ireland was undertaken by Lafferty et al.
(1999) using data from the Census of Agriculture 1991. This analysis suggests
the majority of farmers have commonage grazing rights of less than 30 hectares.
However, there is a cohort of approximately 200 farmers, with entitlements to
about one-third of total commonage area.
All land in the Republic of Ireland is owned either by private individuals or state
bodies and recreational users do not have a de-facto legal right of entry
(Mountaineering Council of Ireland, 2003). A right to roam (Scotland),
everyman’s right of access (Scotland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Germany) or
access land (England and Wales) prevalent across other European countries does
not prevail.
Theoretically, high-value land is more likely to be in private ownership and
protected against trespass (Bromley, 1991). Lands with high economic value for
production, privacy, or game hunting are usually guarded through fencing,
posting4, and threats of prosecution. By contrast, where land is plentiful and
cheap (or marginal), owners spend less time and money fencing or policing their
lands. This has strong resonance for commonage. The Republic of Ireland is
covered with informal walks many of which cross commonage land. Farmers in
the past have put forward the argument of interference with agricultural activity
as an argument for prohibiting recreational access to farmland. If returns to
agriculture from commonage are found to be low, then there is not a great
4 “Posting” is term used in the USA. It refers to legally serving notice on members of the public
that trespassing in general, or certain activities, will not be permitted on the land. The most
common means of posting is to place signs around the perimeter of the property.
8opportunity cost (in any event) to opening up commonage for recreation. There
is little to suggest that the two activities cannot operate in tandem in any event.
However, it must be acknowledged that there are other potential costs to
landowners from recreation whether the activity takes place on land with high or
marginal economic potential. Landowners are concerned that greater public
access for recreation will lead to adverse outcomes such as greater costs arising
from higher insurance premiums, threats to livelihoods via being sued by the
public, threats to crops / livestock and increased workloads that lead to no
meaningful return (Mulder et al., 2006; O’Reilly, 2006; Millward. 1996).
Under the recent Fischler CAP reforms each Member States is to divert a part of
its direct payment endowments towards rural development policies – so called
modulation. EU agricultural policy has shifted from subsidised commodity
production towards supporting the multifunctional role of agriculture. This
specifically includes the production of environmental goods and the delivery of
public goods generally (Ahner, 2003; Kearney, 2000).
There is evidence that the demand for recreation on commonage in Ireland may
be significant. Results from Buckley et al. (2007) reveal a median willingness to
pay for formal access with improved trail infrastructure to upland and lowland
commonage walks of between €5.96 and €9.13. A travel cost study by Hynes et
al. (2007) relating to recreational pursuits on a lowland seashore farm
commonage site in the west of Ireland found that the mean willingness to pay
9(i.e., the consumer surplus + travel cost) of the average recreationalist using the
commonage area in Connemara was €41.92 per trip.
3. Policy provision for commonage in the Republic of Ireland
Under the Less Favoured Areas (LFA) scheme (introduced in 1975), headage
payments were brought in on mountain / hill farming land and farming in certain
less-favoured areas (Hickie, 1999). Seventy-two per cent of the Republic of
Ireland was classified as a Less Favoured Area. In these areas, farmers were
eligible to receive headage (per head) payments for cattle, sheep, goats, horses
and donkeys. The aim of the scheme was to compensate farmers in order to
provide a reasonable level of income in areas with natural disadvantages. In
practice, this incentive system increased production on more marginal farming
land types such as lowland and upland commonage. Further livestock premia
schemes in the form of the ewe and suckler cow premiums were introduced in
1980 (Heritage Council, 1999).
Under the 1992 (McSharry) and 2000 (Agenda 2000) CAP reforms, market
supports were significantly reduced and additional direct livestock based
payments were introduced to off-set a fall in product prices. In operational terms
post Agenda 2000 direct livestock payments included 10 measures overall, six of
which were premia measures (suckler cow, special beef for male cattle, ewe,
extensification, a slaughter premium and area aid for cereals) supported by the
guarantee section of the EAGGF5 and four for headage payments (suckler cows,
5 EAGGF (European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund) is the mechanism through
which the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is financed. It is divided into two sections:
Guarantee section - expenditure on price support, domestic market intervention and refunds and
rural development. Guidance section - support for structural improvements, modernisation of
farms, eradication of animal diseases etc.
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male cattle, sheep / goats and mares) paid to farmers in disadvantaged areas and
partially funded by structural funds6 (Department of Agriculture, Food and Rural
Development 2000) (See Appendix 1 for appropriate rates).
The Rural Environment Protection Scheme7 (REPS) was launched in 1994. Due
to the financial incentives provided by REPS it was thought the scheme would be
highly attractive to farmers in marginal areas and would go some way towards
addressing overgrazing on commonage. Overgrazing in the upland regions in the
west of Ireland became an issue in the early 1990s, mainly as a consequence of
direct livestock payments under the CAP. The common pool nature of
commonage and the lack of institutional controls made it very vulnerable to such
over-exploitation.
Subsequently, targeted EU legislation was introduced which required all
commonage farms, irrespective of whether they were in REPS or not, to farm
according to a Commonage Framework Plan8 (CFP), (Department of
Agriculture, Food and Rural Development 2000). The EU stipulated that
commonage regeneration was to be achieved by the drawing up of a Framework
Plan for every commonage. Since the task of preparing a CFP for every site in
the Republic of Ireland would take some time (it was only finished in 2005) a
blanket 30 per cent de-stocking on all commonages was introduced until an
6 Collective name for the four funds: the European Regional Development Fund, the European
Social Fund, the Guidance section of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund
and the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance.
7 The Rural Environment Protection Scheme (REPS) was introduced in the Republic of Ireland
under EU Council Regulation 2078/92 in order to encourage farmers to carry out their activities
in a more extensive and environmentally friendly manner.
8 The objective of the commonage framework planning process is to set sustainable stocking
levels which will ensure the protection and rejuvenation of commonage areas that are at risk
because of overgrazing.
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individual CFP for every commonage had been prepared. Commonage farmers
in REPS now had to comply with the over-arching compulsory CFP’s.
The Commonage Framework Plans were used to produce individual farm plans.
An overall de-stocking percentage for site specific commonage is specified if the
commonage is overgrazed by domestic animals (Bleasdale, 2000). Each
shareholder in a commonage is obliged to abide by a REPS plan or a farm plan
drawn up by Dúchas9 (if not in REPS) as a condition of eligibility for CAP
related payments. Alternatively the shareholder can withdraw from using
commonage entirely (Department of the Environment and Local Government,
2002). The Dúchas Scheme paid compensation on the basis of proven loss of
income, while REPS payments were fixed and are area based (see Appendix 1
for details).
Under the so called Fischler CAP reform (2002-03) the Republic of Ireland has
opted for full decoupling. This means that a single farm payment has replaced
direct livestock payments since 200510. REPS, the disadvantaged area
compensatory allowance scheme (DACAS)11, the Duchas Scheme and livestock
premia (base year was 2003 and not de-coupled at this time) are the significant
direct payments applicable to commonage farmers in the sample. These schemes
and their associated payment rates are outlined in Appendix 1.
9 The then Irish Heritage Agency.
10 The single farm payment is based on the number of premium claims made in the historical 3
year reference period from 2000-2002.
11 DACAS - Disadvantaged Area Compensatory Allowance Scheme introduced in 2001 to
replace Headage Scheme and paid on a land area basis in disadvantaged areas only.
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4. Methods
The case study area used in this paper was the Connemara region in Co. Galway
Ireland. This is a remote district in the west of Ireland. In the spring and
summer of 2004, questionnaires were undertaken on a face to face basis with the
owner-operators at their residence by trained recorders. Questionnaire delivery
took approximately 45 minutes and followed a standard format. The
questionnaire was piloted for one month during February 2004 and this aided in
the design of the survey. Given the large geographic dispersion associated with
commonage farmers, area cluster sampling was used to draw a sample from the
population based on secured listings12. Townlands or villages with more than 3
commonage farmers were targeted. Geographically, all areas of Connemara
were covered. In total 278 usable questionnaires were collected. Each survey
provided detailed data on revenue and cost summaries, farm premia, labour and
costs of farm operations (particularly in relation to grazing and livestock
activities). Information was also collected on whether each farm included
dairying, sheep, beef or suckler cow production. Additional information on the
movement of livestock was also obtained. The base year for data collected was
2003.
The following conventions were used in data gathering and in performing the
analysis; all inputs even though subsidised were valued at their market price,
production was valued at farm gate prices and all prices were expressed in euros.
Gross margin analysis was used to determine economic returns to commonage
12 A listing of commonage farmers was secured from Teagasc (semi-state) advisors and from
other researchers working with farmers who claimed under the Duchas scheme.
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and to private land from agricultural activity. There is a debate in the literature
as regards to the most appropriate costs to include when analyzing production
decisions in the short run (Jones, 2007), as some costs traditionally thought of as
fixed costs are relevant and link to production. However, in this research gross
output and variables cost categories adopted were in line with that used in the
Teagasc National Farm Survey so that direct comparisons could be drawn for
farms of a similar soil type and topography. This was done for validity
purposes13. During the pilot phase we attempted to collect fixed costs so that net
margins could be derived. However, due to the nature and type of farming in
commonage areas, the quality of information provided by respondents on these
costs was sparse so the focus was placed instead on deriving gross margins.
Stocking rates14 were the main methodology for apportioning outputs and
variable costs between commonage and private land, except where payments
such as REPS and DACAS allowances applied specifically to commonage land.
5. Results
The average total commonage size was 516.6 hectares and the average
commonage shareholding per farm within this was 56.9 hectares as seen in Table
1. There was very little inward or outward leasing of commonage. The average
amount of private land owned was 22.8 hectares. Commonage farms tend not to
be homogenous as seen by the significant standard deviations across Table 1.
Farm size in the sample varies from 4 hectares to over 800 hectares. Sheep was
13 Results were compared with the NFS for mainly hill sheep and cattle rearing farms on marginal
soils.
14 Livestock unit equivalents as used in the Teagasc National Farm Survey and grazing time on
commonage and private land was used to establish relevant stocking rates.
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the main farm enterprise across the sample averaging 12.7 livestock units15 per
farm followed by cattle at 7.0 livestock units. Only two farms had a dairy
enterprise but dairy cows were never grazed on commonage. Other livestock
units consisted mainly of horses, but other enterprises were not prevalent across
the sample and horses were not grazed on commonage.
< Table 1: Average land resource and livestock units per farm >
Within the sample, 12% of respondents did not graze livestock on commonage
during the base year. About 30% of the sample were exclusively sheep farming,
25% were exclusively cattle farming while 45% had both cattle and sheep
enterprises. Sheep was the dominant farm enterprise across 63% of the sample.
The weighted average farm stocking rate across the sample was 0.26 livestock
units per hectare (LU/Ha) as indicated in Table 1. Stocking rates were much
higher on private land at 0.48 LU/Ha compared to 0.16 LU/Ha on commonage.
Commonage framework regulations obviously influenced stocking rates as 44%
of the sample reported having to reduce stocking rates on commonage for
reasons of compliance. In total 76.6% of the sample had a higher stocking rate on
their private land.
Mean total gross output across all sampled farms was €18,690 as shown in Table
2. Direct Payments were responsible for 74% of gross output across the sample
(Livestock premia, REPS, DACAS and Duchas scheme). This is slightly higher
than comparable farms in the NFS which averaged 65% (Connolly et al., 2004).
However, it should be noted that commonage does attract higher payment under
15. A dairy cow is taken as the basic grazing livestock unit of 1. All other grazing stock are given
equivalents in relation to this animal. The following livestock unit equivalents apply suckling
cow is 0.9, cattle 1-2 years are 0.7. Hill ewes are 0.14.
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REPS and DACAS as outlined in Appendix 1. In total 68% of the sample (189
farms) were in REPS and 24% (64 farms) claimed under the Duchas scheme.
Due to the extensive nature of farming in the case study region, livestock premia
were responsible for just 23% of gross output. Area based payments (REPS,
DACAS) were a much larger component, accounting for 47% of gross output.
Average total variable costs across the sample were €4,090. Feed was by far the
most significant cost, accounting for 42% of direct costs. This is broadly in line
with results from the NFS which shows feed costs to be 48% of total direct costs
(Connolly et al., 2004). Livestock purchases (14%), fertilizer (10%), and
veterinary / artificial insemination (12%) were the next most significant costs
across the sample. Average farm gross margin across the sample was €14,600.
This is similar to results from the NFS for a similar cohort of farms operating on
marginal soils (Connolly et al., 2004).
< Table 2: Analysis of average farm gross margin >
In absolute terms, gross margin returns were higher on commonage (€8,004)
compared to private land (€6,596). However, per hectare returns to private land
were 97 per cent higher at €276 compared to €140 for commonage. The average
gross margin per hectare across the entire sample was €180 as indicated in Table
3. When livestock premia payments are excluded (a decoupled scenario) average
farm gross margin falls by 29% to €10,272. Gross margin returns were higher on
private land at €173 per hectare compared to €108 per hectare for commonage. In
all 3% of farms in the sample showed a negative gross margin net of livestock
premia payments. When all subsidies are removed, gross margin falls to €775 per
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farm across the sample. On a per hectare basis, return to private land declined to
€23 and return to commonage to €4 per hectare. In total, 45% of farms indicated
a negative gross margin net of all subsidies.
< Table 3: Analysis of average farm gross margin inclusive and exclusive of
subsidies >
In terms of the distribution of gross margin returns, over 80% of the farms in the
sample have a gross margin under €20,000 as illustrated in Figure 1. One farmer
in the sample indicated a negative gross margin. In total, 31% of the sample had
a gross margin under €10,000, while half the sample had a gross margin between
€10,000 and €20,000. Excluding all subsidies a total of 46% of the farms in the
sample showed a zero or negative gross margin.
< Figure 1: Distribution of farm gross margin inclusive and exclusive of
subsidies>
Results indicate that agricultural returns across the sample were highly dependent
on subsidies. In total, 94% of farm gross margin is attributable to direct
payments, with a 2 to 1 ratio between area based and direct livestock subsidies as
shown in Table 4. In all, 65% of gross margin on commonage and 54 per cent on
private land was attributable to area based subsidies. Due to higher stocking
rates on private land livestock based subsidies were more important accounting
for 43% of gross margin compared to 28% on commonage.
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< Table 4: Analysis of average farm direct payments as a proportion of
gross margin>
The results presented here were restricted to gross margin analysis and do not
factor in overhead costs. Using NFS data and applying it to this sample would
equate to overhead costs of approximately €70 per hectare. Accepting this as a
proxy for our sample, 19% of farms would show a negative overall net margin in
a decoupled scenario and 86 per cent of farms would show a negative net margin
exclusive of all subsidies.
6. Conclusions and discussion
One of the main aims of the study was to explore the importance of commercial
values associated with traditional agricultural activity on commonage. Results
indicate that although farmers had twice as much land in commonage, stocking
rates were three times higher on private land than they were on commonage land.
Additional aims of the study were to evaluate the importance of CAP related
payments to profitability of livestock grazing enterprise on commonage and to
compare returns to commonage with that from privately owned land. Average
gross margin returns were 97% higher on private land at €276 per hectare
compared to €140 per hectare for commonage land. If premia payments directly
linked to livestock production are excluded, a decoupled scenario, average farm
gross margin falls to €173 per hectare for private land and to €108 per hectare for
commonage. In all, 3 per cent of farms in the sample showed a negative gross
margin net of livestock payments. This is lower than might be expected but is
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due to the extensive nature of farming in the region driven by prevailing
topography. When all subsidies (livestock and area based payments) are
removed, returns to private land falls to €23 and to €4 per hectare for
commonage. In total 45 per cent of farms indicate a negative gross margin net of
subsidies. CAP based payments are hence highly significant for positive gross
margin returns. In total 94 per cent of gross margin is attributable to CAP
payments, area based payments were twice as important as livestock subsidies.
The results presented here were restricted to gross margin analysis and do not
factor in overhead costs. Using Teagasc NFS overhead cost data as a proxy then
19% of farms would show a negative overall net margin in a decoupled scenario
and 86% of farms would show a negative net margin exclusive of all subsidies.
It is accepted that production henceforth will be more market driven and this
could precipitate a decline or discontinuation of production in marginal areas
such as commonage (Matthews, 2002). Our results concur with this outlook.
Based on results presented here the opportunity cost to traditional agricultural
activity of opening up the commonage resource for recreational activity would be
low. Indeed there is little to suggest the two activities could not operate in
tandem in any event. Recreational demand for access to desirable landscapes,
such as commonage is estimated to be significant (Buckley et al., 2007, Hynes et
al., 2007). Increased affluence, mobility and changing values have brought about
new demands with respect to landscape, conservation, heritage and recreation,
with a greater emphasis on consumption demands for goods and services in rural
areas. Much of the Republic of Ireland’s commonage is located in remoter
19
coastal, upland and mountainous regions and has considerable recreational
appeal.
However, landowners have concerns about other potential costs from recreation
such as higher insurance premiums, threats to livelihoods via being sued by the
public, threats to crops / livestock and increased workloads that lead to no
meaningful return. Future research needs to examine farmers’ attitudes to the
provision of this public good and identify the conditions necessary for
engagement with this activity.
Results presented above indicate CAP payments to be highly significant for farm
viability in marginal areas. Post Fischler reforms, subsidies in the longer term
are in question. However, land in marginal areas has potentially high recreational
values. The delivery of public goods such as recreational opportunities on
marginal land such as commonage may provide a rationale for continued public
support of farmers in these disadvantaged often remote areas in the future.
Public access for recreation on commonage is an example of the multifunctional
role agriculture could serve in these rural areas.
20
APPENDICES
Appendix 1 - Payment Rates
Disadvantaged Area Compensatory Allowance Scheme Payment Rates
Less Severely Handicapped Lowland and Coastal Areas with Specific
Handicaps:
€76.18 per forage hectare to a maximum of 45 hectares
More Severely Handicapped Lowland:
€88.88 per forage hectare to a maximum of 45 hectares
Mountain Type Grazings in Less or More Severely Handicapped Areas:
€101.58 per hectare on first 10 forage hectares
€88.88 per hectare on remaining forage hectares up to 45 hectares
Rural Environment Protection Scheme
In REPS 2 (1999/2000) farmers who participated in the scheme were
compensated on a per hectare basis (€151per ha) up to a maximum of 40
hectares. Those in targeted areas of high environmental sensitivity received
higher payments, €242 per hectare for the first 40 hectares, €24 per hectare for
the each additional hectare up to 80 hectares and €18 per hectare for each
additional hectare up to 120 hectares. Commonage was designated a target area.
This extra compensation was in recognition of the fact that their compliance with
higher environmental standards is compulsory.
Duchas Scheme:
If de-stocking is required, payments will be made on the loss of calculated gross
margin per ewe de-stocked, using Teagasc data for the year in question. In 2006
this was €27 for each de-stocked ewe. The maximum stocking rate for which
compensation is allowable is 5 ewes/hectare. However, in most other cases the
amount payable will be calculated for the plan, as a combination of the income
foregone and/or the costs of carrying out the plan. Costs can be demonstrated by
receipts, but standard rates may be used. Teagasc Management Data, Department
of Agriculture Farm Investment Scheme, and commercial farm relief fees may
also be used. Payment for losses will also require receipts or similar proof.
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Livestock Premia Basic rates
EU Suckler Cow Premium €224.15
EU Special Beef Premium €150 (9 / 21 months)
Bull Premium €210
Extensification Premium €80 / €40 (Stocking rate dependant)
Slaughter Premium €80
Ewe Premium €21 / €29
Source: (Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Rural Development, 2007).
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Table 1: Average land resource and livestock units per farm
Mean Standard Deviation
Land Resource (Hectares)
Total commonage size 516.6 748.8
Commonage share 56.9 87.1
Commonage leased in 0.32 2.9
Commonage leased out 0.1 1.3
Private land owned 22.8 37.6
Private land leased out 0.2 1.8
Private land leased in 1.2 4.8
Total available land 80.9 96.8






Mean stocking rate Private land Commonage land
Livestock units / hectare 0.48 0.16
(N=278)
* A dairy cow is taken as the basic grazing livestock unit of 1. All other grazing stock are
given equivalents in relation to this animal as recommended by the Teagasc National Farm
Survey.
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Table 2: Analysis of average gross margin
Outputs Mean (€) % output
Livestock sales 4,628 25
Other outputs 246 1
Livestock premia 4,328 23
REPS 5,430 29
DACAS 3,353 18
Duchas Scheme 705 4
Total output 18,690 100
Variable costs Mean (€) % cost
Feed costs 1,715 42
Fertiliser costs 401 10
Crop protection 126 3
Seeds 21 0
Contractors 302 7
Veterinary / artificial insemination 511 13
Livestock purchases 569 14
Casual labour 445 11
Total variable costs 4,090 100
Farm gross margin 14,600
(N=278)
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Farm gross margin 14,600 180 276 140
Gross margin – no livestock subsides 10,272 127 173 108
Gross margin – no subsidies 775 10 23 4
(N=278)
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62 34 118 43 39 28
Area
subsidies
108 60 149 54 91 65
Total 170 94 267 97 130 93
(N=278)
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Figure 1: Distribution of farm gross margin inclusive and exclusive of
subsidies.
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